Valuing Easements: Some Experimental Evidence by Thomas Kalbro & Hans Lind
491





Abstract. Trefzger and Munneke (1998) present a theoretical model, where the surplus
that an easement gives rise to will be split equally between the parties. We provide
experimental evidence from Sweden indicating that the split of the surplus depends on
the context and what is judged to be reasonable principles of a fair distribution. The
dominant estates got a signiﬁcantly higher share of the surplus because they could start
the bargaining with a bid that only included compensation for cost, whereas the servient
estate could not ﬁnd any principle that would give them the whole surplus. After these
initial asymmetric bids, the parties usually met halfway.
Introduction
Trefzger and Munneke (1998) show how bargaining theory and game theory can be
used as a starting point in the valuation of easements. An easement is assumed to
lead to a surplus in the sense that the value of the dominant estate increases more
than the value of the servient estate falls. The price that a dominant estate will have
to pay depends on how this surplus is divided between the parties. In the basic game-
theoretic model used by Trefzger and Munneke, this surplus will be split equally
between the parties. As direct information from the market about the value of an
easement is scarce, such theoretical results are of special interest.
We are very sympathetic to the approach taken by Trefzger and Munneke, which can
be combined with another interesting trend in economics—the use of experiments to
test theories when it is difﬁcult to get data from the ‘‘real’’ economy. A model is
always based on certain assumptions and it is important to be able to judge how
realistic these assumptions are in a speciﬁc situation. Experiments are one way of
checking the relevance of theoretical results and getting information about other
factors that might affect the result. Sefton and Yavas (1996) is perhaps the ﬁrst
example of this in a real estate context. Especially in bargaining situations,
experiments have indicated that views about fairness might affect the results (e.g.,
Roth, 1995), and what is judged to be fair might depend on cultural factors and the
speciﬁc context.
We have made a series of experiments concerning division of the surplus in easement
situations and in most of these cases the surplus was not split equally between the
parties. Instead, the dominant estate tends to get on average two-thirds of the surplus
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Exhibit 1
A Typical Easement Case
and the servient estate only one-third. In the next section, we describe the structure
of the experiments and how they were carried out. The results are then presented and
discussed. The ﬁnal section is the conclusion.
The Experimental Design
The Participants
The subjects in the experiments were students at the School of Surveying, Royal
Institute of Technology, in Stockholm. During an ordinary lecture, they were given
the opportunity to sign up for an economic experiment. They were told that the
experiment concerned economic decision-making, that it would last around one hour
and that they could earn some money if they participated. No details of the topic were
given. Usually around 75% of the class signed up.
The Case
In the experiments we used different real estate related situations, but here we only
look at the easement situations (see Kalbro, Lind and Sonnega ˚rd, 1996 for results for
other situations). A typical case is presented in Exhibit 1. A new public water and
sewer system is built in a neighborhood. There are two ways to connect property B
to this system. One alternative is over his own property; the other alternative is by an
easement. Land conditions are such that the cheaper way is to use an easement. An
easement would lead to a certain inconvenience for A (call this cost C) and a certain
saving for B (call this S). The total gain following from the easement is then S-C. In
some other cases, the easement concerned a road that B needed. The road would cost
C more if it were built on B’s land, compared to a road on A’s land. The question
we wanted to investigate was how the total gain was divided between A and B. In
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Basic Structure of the Bargaining Procedure
In each session there were about twenty to ﬁfty participants. No one participated in
more than one session. In each session, two to three different cases were used. Most
of the cases were used in several sessions. The participants were randomly divided
into owners of dominant estates and owners of servient estates. These two groups
were seated in different rooms and negotiated through written messages. They did not
know the identity of the person they bargained with.
They were informed that the bargaining lasted a maximum of four rounds. If they had
not reached an agreement in round four, their earnings—paid by us—would be zero.
Both parties wrote a message simultaneously in each round. This message consisted
of a bid (for the dominant estate) and an ask (by the servient estate). They could also
write down arguments showing why the bid/ask was reasonable or any other message,
except messages that would make it possible to identify the participants. A deal was
closed when the bid-ask spread was smaller than a certain amount speciﬁed in
advance. This amount was between 2.5% and 5% of the proﬁt. The average between
the bid and the ask would then count as the agreed price. If the agreed price was P,
the proﬁt for the dominant estate would be S-P and for the servient estate, it would
be P-C. We chose this method instead of trying to get agreements at a speciﬁc price
for two reasons. It was a way of saving time, and we also avoided a situation where
one of the parties had the right to make a ﬁnal bid, which the other party then would
have to accept or reject. An experiment where one party could make such a bid could
create an advantage for one of the parties.
In the ﬁrst round, the participants had six to eight minutes to complete bid/ask and
the message. This time was reduced in later rounds as we expected that the participants
then had gained better knowledge of the situation and needed less time. The
instructions and the forms used are presented in the Appendix.
Incentives
In the instructions, the participants were informed that their earnings would be a linear
function of the proﬁt they made. They higher the proﬁt, the more they would be paid.
They also knew that they could earn around SEK 100—around $15 at that time—if
they were good at bargaining. We did not inform them about the exact formula that
we used for calculating their payments. This might have weakened the incentives
somewhat, but we were afraid that if they knew the exact formula that would give
some indication about what we believed was a fair price. In that case, we risked that




The details of these cases are presented in Exhibit 2. Notice that the cost to the servient
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1 5,000 105,000 33
2 1,000 50,000 21
Exhibit 3





Share of Proﬁt Std. Dev.
1 0.18 0.28 0.14
2 0.29 0.29 0.13
Exhibit 4








3 30,000 130,000 12
Exhibit 5





Share of Proﬁt Std. Dev.
3 0.17 0.36 0.13
In Exhibit 3, the results for these cases are presented. The share going to the servient
estate is somewhat less than 30%. The statistical tests show that the split is
signiﬁcantly different from 50–50 at the 99% level. As can be seen by the share of
cases that did not end with agreement, the bargaining was sometimes very tough.
How Robust are the Results?
We wanted to investigate if the results for these cases depended on speciﬁc
circumstances and therefore made a series of experiments where we systematically
changed some of the assumptions. First, we constructed a case where the loss to the
servient estate was higher (see Exhibit 4). Notice that the number of bargaining pairs
is smaller in this case. The results are presented in Exhibit 5.VALUING EASEMENTS: SOME EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 495
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4 5,000 100,000 26
Exhibit 7





Share of Proﬁt Std. Dev.
4 0.23 0.43 0.08
The average share going to the servient estate is somewhat higher in this case.
Statistical tests show that this result is signiﬁcantly different from 0.50 at the 99%
level. A t-test also shows that the share is not quite, but very close to being
signiﬁcantly higher at the 95% level than the share in experiment 1.
In all the cases so far, both parties had been individuals, and the easement concerned
a ‘‘necessity,’‘ a water pipe or a road. In a fourth case, we described the situation as
one where the dominant estate was a ﬁrm/organization that wanted to build a
conference hotel, and that they wanted an easement for a (cheaper) road to their
property. The data are given in Exhibit 6 and the result in Exhibit 7.
What we see here is that the share going to the servient estate increased even more,
and now it is coming closer to the theoretical predictions. The share is, however, still
signiﬁcantly different from 0.5 at the 99% level, and also from the share in experiment
1.
Possible Explanations and Concluding Comments
The results presented raise two questions: why are the proﬁts divided in a way that
is signiﬁcantly different from an equal split? and why are there signiﬁcant differences
between how proﬁts are divided in the different cases?
In Exhibit 8, we present the average bids/ask in the ﬁrst round in the different cases,
and also the halfway point between these initial bids/asks (only the cases where there
was an agreement are included). In the ﬁnal column, the level of actual agreements
are restated.
In Exhibit 8, we can see that the parties tend to meet around halfway between the
initial bids. Only in case 2 is there a signiﬁcant difference (at the 95% level) between
the halfway point and the actual result. (In case 4, there is an outlier in the initial496 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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1 0.62 0.94 0.34 0.28
2 0.78 0.98 0.40 0.28
3 0.73 0.99 0.37 0.36
4 0.90 0.88 0.51 0.43
demands from the servient estate. If that single observation is deleted, the average of
the initial demand falls to 0.81 and the halfway point falls to 0.46.)
Thus, it seems that a ﬁnal agreement is a result of a two-stage process. First, the
parties establish their initial positions. Second, given these positions, the parties meet
halfway. The tendency to meet halfway can also be seen in the bargaining games
presented in Yavas, Miceli and Sirmans (1999, Table 3).
Our hypothesis concerning the initial demands is that the parties feel that they have
to fall back on some more general principle (Young, 1991). As they want to have a
large share, they look for a principle that furthers their own interest, given the
restriction that the principle can be accepted as a starting point by the other party. In
the written comments, the dominant estate tended to start by offering only
compensation for damages. This explains why the share that they demand is close to
one. The best principle the servient estate could ﬁnd was an equal split—and then
adding some bargaining margin. This can explain why they start from demands in the
interval 0.60–0.80.
Exhibit 8 also suggests that the difference between case 1 and case 3 is driven by
changes in demands by the servient estate. When there is a substantial cost involved,
the servient estate seems to feel that they deserve a higher share of the surplus.
The difference between case 1 and case 4 is driven by changes in demands from both
parties. The ﬁrms/organizations are more prepared to offer part of the surplus, and
the individual acting as servient estate wants a higher share in this case.
The experiments indicate that the principles that both parties judge as relevant as a
starting point will affect how the surplus is split and what the price of the easement
will be. The differences between the cases suggest that this will depend on the speciﬁc
context. The price might, for example, be higher if the dominant estate is a strict
commercial enterprise instead of an ordinary neighbor.
Comments by an American referee and British colleagues suggest that there can be
cross-cultural differences. There is a belief that the share going to the servient estateVALUING EASEMENTS: SOME EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 497
would be higher in the U.S. and Great Britain. That compensation for costs is one
reasonable starting point might be a speciﬁc Swedish phenomenon related to, perhaps,
a comparatively weak sense of private ownership. The result might also be related to
an idea that has been prevailing in Sweden saying that the ‘‘active party’’ should have
the proﬁt, while others shall just be compensated for their losses.
If we go back to the theoretical model used by Trefzger and Munneke, we note that
the basic game theoretic model includes an argument about symmetry. If there are no
relevant differences between parties, they should get the same share. In the model,
there are no such differences. What our experiments suggest is that the legitimacy of
certain ethical principles in society can create an asymmetry and that the consequence
of this can be that one party gets a higher share than the other. The role of values in
economic decision making has been given increasing attention in recent years (e.g.,
Ben-Ner and Putterman, 1998). From that perspective, the experiments suggest an
interesting combination of ethical principles and self-interest. The participants tended
to argue in terms of principles of fairness, but they chose the principles that furthered
their own interests.
Finally, the details of the design of an economic experiment can always be questioned.
A possible variation is the one studied by Yavas, Miceli and Sirmans (1999) where a
broker is introduced. However, the material presented here shows that experiments
can be a useful complement to theoretical arguments like those presented by Trefzger
and Munneke. When we lack data from the market, both theoretical arguments and
experimental results can be used as evidence, even though it is far from conclusive.
Appendix
General Instructions (to servient estate) and Forms
The Situation Imagine that another property wants to have the right to use part of your
property for a speciﬁc purpose. The owner of the other property contacts you and
wants to have an easement over your property. Discussions about the price start. You
and the other party have to agree on the price, otherwise there will be no easement.
There are no legal possibilities to force you.
The Bargaining Procedure You shall on the form for round 1 state how much you
demand for giving the other property an easement (Form 1). On the form, you can
also write a message to the person who wants the easement (e.g., why you think that
the amount that you demand is reasonable). You will have six minutes to do this.
When you are ready, you shall also write your demand on the form called
‘‘Compilation/Overview.’’ (The Swedish word is ‘‘Sammansta ¨llning,’’ Form 2.) We
will collect the form with your demand and your message.
Notice the following: You are not allowed to write anything that makes it possible
for the other to identify you. Furthermore, you are not allowed to say anything about
how much money you will earn given a certain price. If you do this, your earnings
will be zero.498 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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The other party (who is in a room nearby) states at the same time a bid for the
easement. This, together with the message from that person, will be handed to you
after the six minutes. Note this bid on the form Compilation/Overview. At the same
time, he/she will be given your demand and message.
If the difference between what you demand and the other party’s bid is SEK 2,500
or less, we will say that you agree. The ﬁnal price will be the average of what you
demanded and what he/she bid. If you demand less than the other’s bid, the bargaining
is also over and the price will be the average of demanded price and bid.
If the difference is larger than SEK 2,500, the bargaining will continue. You ﬁll in
the form for Round 2. You can now either demand less or stick to your earlier demand.
You are not allowed to demand more. Once more, you can write a message to the
other. In this round, the time limit will be ﬁve minutes. When you are ready, note
your demand on the Compilation/Overview form.
Meanwhile, the other party has done the same, and either raised the bid or stuck to
the earlier bid. He/she is not allowed to lower the bid. After the ﬁve minutes, you
will be given the form with the bid and message for Round 2 and you shall note the
bid on the Compilation/Overview form.
If the difference between demand and bid is SEK 2,500 or less, we will say that you
agree. The same is the case if you demand less than the other bids. The ﬁnal price
will be the average of bid and demand. If the difference is larger than SEK 2,500,
you will continue to Round 3. The rules are exactly the same as in Round 2. The
time limit in Round 3 will be four minutes.
If the difference between demand and bid is higher than SEK 2,500 also in Round 3
you will go to the fourth and ﬁnal round. The rules are the same as before. The time
limit will be four minutes. If the difference is more than SEK 2,500, there will be no
transaction and you will not earn any money.
After Round 4, we will collect all forms. If you have come to an agreement before
Round 4 just sit and wait until everybody is ready.
You are not allowed to discuss with anyone during the session, but you can raise your
hand and ask questions any time and we will come around and answer.
How Much You Will Earn
The higher price you get, the more money will you earn. Your earnings will be
calculated from the following formula:
Your earnings 5 Constant * (the agreed price 2 the loss of value on your initial
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If the price is the same as, or less than, the loss of value on your property, your
earnings will be zero. In the speciﬁc case that you will get information about soon,
you can see what is your highest possible earning and at what price you will get this
earning. A higher price than that won’t lead to higher earnings. On the form, you can
also see what price different principles of distribution imply.
The only thing you know about the other’s earnings is that he/she earns more the
lower price he/she has to pay for the easement. You don’t know the exact relation
between the ﬁnal price and the earnings of the other.
During the session, we will carry out all this for two different cases. Your ﬁnal
earnings will be the average of your earnings in the two cases. The money will be
paid to you next week in sealed envelopes. No other participant will know how much
you have earned and you will not know how much other participants have earned.
Form 1: Sellers’ version
No........




Form 2: Seller’s Version
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The Case (No. 2)
In the area between Va ¨stergatan/So ¨dergatan the municipality has built a public water
and sewer system. Property A (which you own) and property B wants to use this
system.
For property B there are two alternatives, either building a connecting pipe over
property B or using an easement over your property. The alternative to draw the pipe
over your property will be considerably cheaper, because of shorter pipes and better
ground conditions. Property B therefore contacts you in order to agree about a price
for this easement. (Exhibit 1 was included here.)
Notice: The person you are bargaining with in this case is not the same person as
you will bargain with in the forthcoming case.
Information about the case: If there is an easement, your property will fall in value
with SEK 1,000. If there is an easement, property B will save SEK 50,000.
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